SECOND
DIVISION
Spouses
Michael Uy & G.R. No. 158370
Bonita
Uy,
Petitioners,
-
versus - Present:
EDUARDO ARIZA, ERLINDA A. PUNO, J.,
Chairperson,
ABDON, BENJAMIN ARIZA, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
TERESITA A. SIMPORIOS,
HEIRS OF MARIANO ARIZA, JR., *AZCUNA, and
namely: JUANITA L. ARIZA, GARCIA, JJ.
DENNIS L. ARIZA, ROLDAN L.
ARIZA, & JOVANNI L. ARIZA;
and
the Heirs of FAUSTO ARIZA,
namely:
JESUSA ARIZA, THELMA SOLLANO,
ARTURO ARIZA, ELDINA CONOS, Promulgated:
VILMA SABERON, & REBECCA
PADULLO,
Respondents.
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D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
The facts:
On
Petitioners exercised their right to choose within two to
three months from the sale, informing respondents that they have selected and
in fact occupied around 200 square meters of a portion of land.[2]
On
It
appears that the parcels of land petitioners had chosen and occupied were
already titled in the names of the Delgados, namely, Carlos, Allan and Antonio,
Jr. Although originally part of Lot No. 3229-C-2-F,
the two parcels of land were part of some 3,500 square meters that were
purportedly sold by the respondents to the Delgados on
Petitioners
were sued for unlawful detainer by the Delgados. In September 1998, petitioners entered into a
compromise agreement with the Delgados and surrendered possession of the subject
parcels of land. Petitioners compromised
the case without giving notice to respondents. [6]
Thereafter, petitioners demanded from respondents that they
be allowed to choose again from Lot No. 3229-C-2-F. When respondents refused, petitioners filed, on
Respondents filed their answer and by way of special and
affirmative defenses alleged that they had already complied with their
obligation to deliver, as petitioners had already chosen and been in possession
of the parcels of land they chose.[9] Respondents also faulted petitioners for losing
possession of the parcels of land by entering into a compromise agreement with
the Delgados on two grounds: first, because respondents have allegedly
initiated the necessary legal steps to defend their possessory rights to the
disputed land by filing a case for the declaration of nullity of the title of
the Delgados, and second, because petitioners failed to interpose a
third-party complaint to implead respondents in the unlawful detainer case.[10]
The trial court denied respondents’
motion to dismiss based on their Special and Affirmative Defenses as well as
their motion for reconsideration.[11] They
went to the Court of Appeals on an action for certiorari and prohibition
contending that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that:
1.
petitioners had a cause of action for specific
performance against respondents;
2.
petitioners erroneously selected the parcels of land
by some unfortunate turn of events so that the portions selected were not owned
by respondents but the Delgados; and
3.
the parcels of land were owned by the Delgados, a
conclusion that was premature considering that the case for the declaration of
nullity of the Delgados’ title covering the parcels was pending before the
trial court.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the orders
of the trial court. It held that
petitioners had no cause of action to file a case of specific performance
against respondents.[12] It ruled that the proper remedy of the
petitioners is an action for enforcement of warranty against eviction.
Petitioners now come before this Court on a petition
for review on the following issues:
(1) whether the complaint filed in the RTC by petitioners
fails to state a cause of action for specific performance with delivery of
possession of real property and damages against respondents; and
(2) whether
the RTC’s denial of the motion to dismiss on lack of cause of action was the
proper subject of certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
We
deny the petition.
We quote with approval the following ruling of the
appellate court, viz:
At the outset, it could already be seen
that indeed, [petitioners] have no cause of action against [respondents]. The
case for specific performance which was filed by [petitioners] against [respondents]
is not the proper remedy in this case. Rather, said action was purely an
afterthought on the part of [petitioners] when they were eventually evicted
from the lots they bought from [respondents].
The facts of the case are very
clear. [Petitioners] bought from [respondents]
a 200 square meter lot which was part of a bigger parcel of land covered by TCT
No. 20007 registered in the names of [respondents], and which [petitioners] immediately
took possession of. After a year, [petitioners]
again bought from [respondents] and took possession of the adjacent lot also
measuring 200 square meters. Since the sale, [petitioners] had been in peaceful
possession of the lots until they were evicted from the same by third persons
claiming to be the owners of the said lots. Thus, if [petitioners] have a cause
of action against [respondents], it would be one for the enforcement of
warranty against eviction and not one for specific performance.
The core of [petitioners’] argument to
support their action for specific performance was that [respondents] failed to
deliver to them the lots subject matter of the sale, since what was delivered
were not owned by [respondents] but by third persons. They likewise maintain that they were not
able to exercise their choice on which lot to occupy as agreed upon by
them. We do not find these arguments
tenable. The truth of the matter is that [respondents] were able to deliver the
said parcels of land to [petitioners].
It could not be said that [petitioners were] deprived of their choice on
which parcel of land they were to buy and occupy. The fact that they even decided to buy the
lot adjacent to the first lot they bought would clearly indicate that the said
lots were their choice. Moreover, [petitioners] had been enjoying possession of
the same until an unlawful detainer case was filed against them by third
persons. After having enjoyed the
property for sometime, [petitioners] cannot now come before the court claiming
that [respondents] failed to deliver the property subject of the sale.
There is no denying also that these lots
were originally part of a bigger parcel of land owned by [respondents] and
covered by TCT No. 20007. That third
persons armed with a certificate of title in their favor suddenly surfaced
claiming to be the owners of the subject lots does not automatically render the
delivery made by [respondents] to [petitioners] ineffectual. Stated otherwise,
although third persons later on claimed ownership over the property, it does
not mean that [respondents] failed to deliver the lots subject matter of the
sale. It is also worth mentioning that
the claim of these third persons to the subject lots is being disputed by [respondents]
as in fact, they filed an action for the declaration of nullity of the title of
Allan, Carlos and Antonio Delgado over the subject lots and which up to now is
still pending before the Court of Appeals.
This action on the part of [respondents] would show that they do not
recognize the right of these third persons to the subject lots and that [respondents]
still maintain that they are the lawful owners of the same.
What is before Us is a clear case of
eviction. Thus, the action for specific
performance filed by [petitioners] against [respondents] must necessarily
fail. If at all, [petitioners] may file
an action for the enforcement of warranty in case of eviction which every
vendor of a parcel of land is enjoined by law to guarantee as provided under
Article 1548 of the New Civil Code:
Art. 1548. Eviction shall take place whenever by a final
judgment based on a right prior to the sale or an act imputable to the vendor,
the vendee is deprived of the whole or part of the thing purchased.
The vendor shall answer for the eviction
even though nothing has been said in the contract on the subject.
The contracting parties, however, may
increase, diminish or suppress this legal obligation of the vendor.
But even if [petitioners] would file an
action for the enforcement of warranty in case of eviction against [respondents],
We are afraid that the same will not prosper. The records of the case reveal that
the unlawful detainer case filed by third persons against [petitioners], which
led to the ouster of the latter from the subject lots, was decided by
compromise agreement without impleading [respondents] as third-party defendants.
It should be stressed that in order for the case to prosper, it is a
precondition that the seller must have been summoned in the suit for the
eviction of the buyer. This rule is
provided under the provisions of Articles 1558 and 1559 of the New Civil Code,
to wit:
Art. 1558. The vendor shall not be obliged to make good
the proper warranty, unless he is summoned in the suit for eviction at the
instance of the vendee.
Art. 1559. The defendant vendee shall ask, within the
time fixed in the Rules of Court for answering the complaint, that the vendor be
made a co-defendant.
Applying the above-quoted provisions of
law, the Supreme Court enumerated the requisites in the enforcement of a
vendor’s liability for eviction, in the case of Maria Luisa De Leon Escaler and
Ernesto Escaler v. Court of Appeals, et al., [G.R. No. L-42636. August 1,
1985.], to wit:
In order that a vendor’s liability for
eviction may be enforced, the following requisites must concur – a) there must be a final judgment; b) the purchaser has been deprived of the whole
or part of the thing sold; c) said
deprivation was by virtue of a right prior to the sale made by the vendor; and
d) the vendor has been summoned and made
co-defendant in the suit for eviction at the instance of the vendee. In the case at bar, the fourth requisite –
that of being summoned in the suit for eviction (Case No. 4252) at the instance
of the vendee – is not present.
We need only add that petitioners could have filed a
third-party complaint against the respondents when they were sued for eviction
by the
Delgados under Rule 6, Section 11.[13] In Firestone Tire and Rubber
Co. of the
The third-party
complaint, is x x x a procedural device whereby a ‘third party’ who is neither
a party nor privy to the act or deed complained of by the plaintiff, may be
brought into the case with leave of court, by the defendant, who acts as
third-party plaintiff to enforce against such third-party defendant a right for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of the
plaintiff’s claim. The third-party
complaint is actually independent of and separate and distinct from the
plaintiff’s complaint. Were it not for
this provision of the Rules of Court, it would have to be filed independently
and separately from the original complaint by the defendant against the
third-party. But the Rules permit
defendant to bring in a third-party defendant or so to speak, to litigate his
separate cause of action in respect of plaintiff’s claim against a third party
in the original and principal case with the object of avoiding circuitry of
action and unnecessary proliferation of lawsuits and of disposing expeditiously
in one litigation the entire subject matter arising from one particular set of
facts. Prior leave of Court is
necessary, so that where the allowance of a third-party complaint would delay
the resolution of the original case, such as when the third-party defendant
cannot be located or where matters extraneous to the issue of possession would
unnecessarily clutter a case of forcible entry, or the effect would be to
introduce a new and separate controversy into the action, the salutary object
of the rule would not be defeated, and the court should in such cases require
the defendant to institute a separate action. x x x.
If
petitioners filed the third-party complaint against the respondents, they could
have sought from the respondents “x x x contribution, indemnity, subrogation or
any other relief” in respect of the claim of the Delgados. The phrase “any other relief” includes a
claim of a vendee for warranty against the vendor.[15]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
* On official business.
[1] Rollo, pp. 45-48.
[2] Petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration with the CA, rollo, p. 30. See rollo, p. 7.
[3] Rollo, p. 8. See CA rollo, p. 5.
[4] Rollo, pp. 41-43.
[5]
[6] See CA rollo, p. 59.
[7] Civil Case No. 99-03-41, raffled
to RTC Branch 8,
[8] Plaintiffs’ (now Petitioners)
Complaint in RTC Branch 8, CA rollo, p. 14.
[9] Defendants’ (now Respondents)
Answer in RTC Branch 8, CA rollo, pp. 20 and 21.
[10]
[11] RTC Order dated
[12] CA Decision promulgated
[13] Sec. 11. Third, (fourth, etc.)–party complaint. – A
third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may,
with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action, called
the third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim.
[14] L-24399,
[15] Castillo v. Samonte, 106
Phil. 1023 (1960).